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Nancy Easterlin
“Who Was it iF it Wasn’t me?” the ProBlem 
oF orientation in alice munro’s “tresPasses”:         
a cognitive ecological analysis
Contemporary evolutionary social science covers a lot of territory, and in 
its efforts to explain how humans have successfully held their ground, one 
of the few claims that enjoys consensus is this: narrative thinking is fun-
damental to survival. In the thinking-acting flow of human life, a blend of 
sequence, causality, and agency is indispensable. Narrativity thus evinces 
one sustained link between science and literature, for we think, move, and 
tell stories in lines. Yet once evolutionary and cognitive literary scholars 
recover from the heady feeling that their hard work connecting the divi-
sions of knowledge has been validated, they may ask themselves, “What 
next?” How does the essential nature of narrative thinking contribute 
specifically to literary knowledge? Since much literary modernism is, after 
all, the history of attempts to write our way out of narrative’s apparent 
intransigence, further evidence of our psychic dependence on its structure 
may not be self-evidently welcome or necessarily useful.
But the intransigence of narrativity does not imply its ease, and the 
purpose of this essay is to demonstrate that some of our best literature 
dramatizes the difficult process of establishing even the apparently ubiq-
uitous trajectory of narrative order. In her story “Trespasses,” Alice Munro 
troubles narrative thinking at the most fundamental point of orientation, 
the referential origin. In the following essay, I will explain how a dynamic 
model of ecological cognition extends previous work in evolutionary 
literary criticism by enabling us to analyze cognitive challenges to narra-
tivizing in process. My essay has three steps: first, I situate my ecological 
approach in the context of current evolutionary literary criticism; second, 
I argue that this dynamic approach explains cognition extending from real-
world negotiation into literary processing; and third, I provide an analysis 
of Alice Munro’s challenge to the reader’s attempt to orient (and from 
there, proceed with narrative construal) in the beginning of “Trespasses.”
One theme of “Trespasses,” as of much of Munro’s longer fiction, 
is the difficulty of establishing authoritative narrative accounts. In 
“Meneseteung” and “The Wilderness Station,” for example, the problem of 
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reconstructing a factually accurate narrative account is bound up with the 
incomplete history of women on the frontier. Whereas newspaper stories 
of local incidents and letters by those (typically men) seeking to shepherd 
single women into respectable social life give one version of events, those 
versions by women themselves, Munro suggests, have died with them, left 
to the author of fiction to imagine. However, the difficulty of authentic and 
complete reconstructions of events in Munro’s fiction is not, on the whole, 
a problem of history, and much less of an exuberant postmodern sensi-
bility, but of a general conviction that life is comprised of “disconnected 
realities” (qtd. in Nunes 14). Even so, Munro’s fiction most often suggests 
that a determinate set of events lies behind the text, but that the con-
flicting self-justifications of her characters undermine narrative certainty. 
Familiar motives and shortcomings—the everyday dishonesty fostered by 
self-interest; the inclination to suppress what is ugly and disturbing; and 
the failure to exhibit a systematic sense of responsibility in our dealings 
with others—animate the accounts of Munro’s characters.
Indeed, as Munro brings conflicting interests and accounts to the fore, 
the desideratum of factual accuracy loses authority as the reader focuses 
on ethical concerns and shapes a value- rather than event-based narrative 
account from the discrepancies. Not surprisingly, then, Munro’s preoc-
cupation with accurate accounts is not merely thematic, but informs the 
structure of many of her stories, whose meandering beginnings challenge 
the reader’s basic efforts at orientation. In “Trespasses,” Munro’s circuitous 
delineation of the ambiguity surrounding events and the evasions that 
sustain those ambiguities are a product of her delayed introduction of 
the main character (and thus the orienting consciousness), a delay that 
confounds the reader’s ability to prioritize and evaluate incidents and 
information, and so to determine narrative relevance. Typically, readers 
approach literature under the assumption that the author will provide a 
speaker, a narrator, or a character to serve as a central point of reference, 
focusing emotional-cognitive effort in the literary environment and, in 
consequence, motivating and guiding reasoning processes in the direction 
of constructing and sustaining narrative order. This is, in some respects, a 
matter of convention, but as I hope to show, our readerly commitment to 
what narratologists call character functions, and with them many mimetic 
conventions, derives from evolved patterns of cognition (Phelan 28). In 
my view, the reader’s commitment to character functions is the imagina-
tive equivalent of a real-world self, and its absence can deprive the reader 
of a vantage point for seeing, cognizing, and acting. Thus, when Munro 
intentionally withholds her main character’s identity for the first six pages 
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of “Trespasses,” she deprives her readers of the point of orientation (the 
character function) that will prompt for and facilitate narrative construc-
tion. Munro’s goal in thus disabling event- and fact-based narrativity is to 
fully reveal the psychologically disabling conditions of that main charac-
ter’s life and the ethically troubling domain of her upbringing. 
synthesizing evolutionary and ecological Psychology
Evolutionary approaches to literature emerged in the United States in 
the nineties, initially as a response to extreme postmodern constructionist 
claims about the nature of the self, reality, language, and representation. 
Since the publication of the inaugural efforts, evolutionary criticism has 
become a recognized field in literary studies, diversifying in methods and 
angles of approach, and in many cases joining forces with the closely 
allied area of cognitive approaches to literature. Ecological psychology, a 
dynamic theory of information pick up that focuses on evolved perceptual 
systems, provides an important theoretical link between evolutionary 
social science and cognitive neuroscience. An early contributor to the 
embodiment paradigm, ecological psychology emphasizes the situated and 
integrated nature of thought and action.
The term “evolutionary psychology” admits of two different uses. In the 
broad use, it refers to all areas of psychology and neuroscience compat-
ible with the theory of evolution by natural selection. In its narrow use, 
it refers to those psychologists (including Leda Cosmides, John Tooby, 
Steven Pinker, Margo Wilson, Martin Daly, and David Buss) who claim 
that the basic architecture of the human mind was formed during the 
Pleistocene in the Environment of Evolutionary Adaptation (EEA). During 
this hypothesized major period of species evolution, domain-specific 
organs and modules arose in response to specific adaptive problems in 
the environment. Closely allied with although somewhat more narrow in 
focus than E. O. Wilson’s sociobiology, this so-called Santa Barbara evolu-
tionary psychology takes a Swiss army knife or modular approach to the 
mind, positing that adaptations—including such things as cheater detec-
tion, mating strategies, language capacity, landscape preferences, and fear 
of snakes and spiders—constitute basic components of our species nature.
As Kevin N. Laland and Gillian R. Brown note in their overview of evo-
lutionary approaches to behavior and psychology, the concept of the EEA 
at the core of Santa Barbara evolutionary psychology is, as Cosmides and 
Tooby themselves acknowledge, a “statistical composite” rather than an 
actual time and place. The notion of EEA adaptedness “can only be partly 
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true,” a point of view that is reinforced by current research in evolutionary 
biology which indicates that some evolutionary processes are much faster 
than previously realized, occurring within twenty-five generations or 
approximately a thousand years (Laland and Brown 181). Furthermore, 
while Cosmides and Tooby themselves insist that psychological adapta-
tions do not determine behavior, their emphasis on psychological mecha-
nisms to the exclusion of environmental circumstances in which behaviors 
are manifest tends to suggest a strong correlation between mechanism and 
behavioral outcome.
In fact, theories of domain-specific cognition like that of Santa Barbara 
evolutionary psychology occupy one end of a continuum, at the oppo-
site end of which lie theories of domain-general intelligence and thus, 
as Laland and Brown point out, these perspectives on psychology and 
behavior are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, recent work on the evolution 
of the mind in cognitive psychology and cognitive archaeology empha-
sizes the other end of that continuum, stressing the need for flexibility 
in cognition, which is especially characteristic of the human species. As 
Merlin Donald argues in The Origins of the Modern Mind: Three Stages in the 
Evolution of Culture and Cognition, humans are high on intuitive knowing 
and low on rules. Like Santa Barbara evolutionary psychologists, Donald 
describes a mind whose architecture is highly differentiated and special-
ized; however, he insists that a major problem with some modular and 
unitary theories of mind is that there was not sufficient evolutionary time 
for some of the hypothesized modules to evolve. This is particularly the 
case, for example, for a complex adaptation like language, which some 
evolutionary psychologists, including Pinker, claim is hardwired into the 
brain. Much current research indicates high plasticity not only in infant 
but also in adult brains, such that “culture can literally reconfigure the use 
patterns of the brain” (Donald 14). Moreover, Donald points out that not 
all cognitive models revealed by data are necessarily bounded by genetic 
evolution. Indeed, his larger argument explains how humans enjoy an 
enormous expansion of cognition through the nonbiological, cultural 
developments of symbolic systems that enable external storage (and thus 
expanded memory capacity).
In a similar vein, Steven Mithen notes that a wide variety of psycholo-
gists try to account for varied and seemingly innate domain-specific intel-
ligences while simultaneously acknowledging the fluidity and creativity of 
human thought (Prehistory). Approaching the subject as an archaeologist 
and thus basing his “cognitive archaeology” on the evidence provided 
by artifacts and living arrangements at prehistoric sites, Mithen hypoth-
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esizes that humans underwent a cognitive explosion 60,000–30,000 years 
ago, one that enabled the transfer of knowledge between previously dis-
crete natural history, social, and technological mental domains. For an 
extremely long period of human evolution, between 1.8 million to 100,000 
years ago, large human brains apparently operated under distinctive con-
straints. For instance, the flake production of hand axes required great 
skill, especially given the need to adjust technique in response to diverse 
stone quality. Yet among the Neanderthals, technology remained extremely 
conservative for about a million years. There is no evidence of tools made 
of bone and antler, tools with several components, or artifacts designed for 
specific activities. By the same token, whereas large brains typically cor-
respond to high social intelligence and social complexity, archaeological 
evidence suggests that the large-brained Neanderthals paradoxically lived 
in small groups with little or no social structure. The cultural explosion 
of the Middle to Upper Paleolithic, by contrast, includes body adornment, 
cave paintings at Lascaux and in Chauvet cave in the Ardèche, and rep-
resentational figurines. According to Mithen, such artworks require the 
mental conception of an image, intentional communication, and attribu-
tion of meaning, blending technical, social, and natural history domains.
Like Donald and Mithen, ecological psychologists emphasize the need 
for cognitive and behavioral flexibility, but they take the perspective of an 
organism’s real-time negotiation of its immediate environment. Edward 
Reed maintains that twentieth-century psychology has been hampered 
by the “two environments” assumption, dividing a scientific psychology, 
which focuses on the body, from a psychology of mental states, which 
was, in Reed’s estimation, essentially unscientific until J. J. Gibson inau-
gurated ecological psychology in the sixties. Gibson developed ecological 
psychology as an alternative to the stimulus-response model that governed 
the study of sensation and perception, according to which the impulses 
along nerve fibers (sensation) constituted the basis of perception. Pointing 
out that the SR model only describes the process of a passive observer 
and that, additionally, sensation is not the raw data of perception, Gibson 
argued that psychologists needed to address the ecology of stimulation. 
Basing his theory on evolutionary premises, Gibson presents a theory 
of information pick up in The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems, 
according to which higher animals have evolved adjustable sense organs 
and mobile extremities for the purpose of obtaining stimulation from the 
environment. Terrestrial animals orient towards gravity and the surface of 
support, and upright posture of the body is essential to the orienting of 
perceptual systems, which appear to have evolved clustered around the 
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head to enable exploratory activity independent of performatory activity. 
According to Gibson, all perceptual systems aid locomotion and geograph-
ical orientation. The auditory system, for instance, is not simply a hearing 
device; it enables detection of the direction of an event and facilitates the 
organism’s orientation to it, and thus head movement is crucially integral 
to it (Gibson 32–75). 
In the “two environments” assumption that ecological psychology 
sought to overturn, literary scholars recognize Cartesian dualism, which 
sometimes correlates institutionally with the “two cultures” paradigm: one 
set of procedures and type of knowledge for the humanities and another 
for the sciences. Darwinian and cognitive literary critics seek to transcend 
this dichotomized view of humans through a unified understanding of 
mind-body processes and their relevance to the cultural artifacts our spe-
cies produces. But developing and maintaining a conception of mind that 
stays connected to the bodily basis of cognition is, it turns out, a rather 
taller order than many of us initially supposed. Why is this so? We tend 
to hide the body and the visceral responses that are the precondition and 
motivation for the lowest to highest levels of consciousness. As Antonio 
Damasio explains, “I could describe the hiding of the body as a distrac-
tion, but I would have to add that it is a very adaptive distraction. In most 
circumstances, rather than concentrating resources on our inner states, 
it is perhaps more advantageous to concentrate one’s resources on the 
images that describe problems out in the world or on the premises of those 
problems or on the options for their solution and their possible outcomes” 
(29). Hiding the body is apparently endemic and systematic: “One of the 
chief ways the body hides from our conscious awareness,” claims philoso-
pher Mark Johnson, “is a result of what Michael Polanyi (1969) called the 
‘from-to’ character of perception. All our acts of perception are directed to 
or at what is experienced and away from the body doing the perceiving. 
This is what phenomenologists call the intentionality of the mind” (4–5). 
A simple evolutionary logic dictates the concentration of perception, 
cognition, and consciousness on external phenomena. Because the great 
challenges to survival come overwhelmingly from outside the individual 
organism, directing attention outward serves organismic fitness, as the 
evolution of perceptual systems and cognitive predispositions for environ-
mental exploration attests.
“Hiding the body,” which lurks even in diverse evolutionary and cog-
nitive theories based on specifically Darwinian premises, is probably an 
inherent characteristic of sensate organisms, whether “hard-wired” into 
cognition or the nervous system or simply an upshot of the strictures of 
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living on the ground. What is especially useful in ecological psychology, 
then, is its insistent focus on the chief priority of an organism dynamically 
situated in a physical environment that is itself dynamic. That priority is 
gathering information that will enable the organism to take advantage of 
affordances (opportunities for action). Because information about preda-
tors, weather events, food, and sexual opportunities is not distributed 
predictably in any natural environment, even simple organisms must be 
capable of behavioral plasticity or flexibility, a feature of behavior that 
Darwin demonstrated with his earthworm experiments (Reed 17). For 
species with brains, and even more so for species with big brains, the 
capacity for behavioral and cognitive flexibility is vastly expanded. 
Ecological psychology provides an important perspective for evolu-
tionary literary critics because, first, it reminds us that mental processes 
are not merely situated in a physical body but serve that body through 
forms of internal action like cognition and emotion, and second, it assumes 
that the primary motivation and orientation of any organism is epistemic. 
Although higher organisms are highly motivated to pursue sexual encoun-
ters and to obtain food, the basic logic of survival indicates that percep-
tual survey and cognitive evaluation of the environment operates as a 
primary and ongoing background activity to more specific motivations. 
However, even though ecological psychology adds another dimension to 
the Darwinian argument for flexibility in behavior and cognition, it cannot 
serve as a substitute for the other subfields of evolutionary social science 
discussed here, all of which are generally compatible. One especially good 
reason that ecological psychology does not provide a total answer for 
evolutionary literary critics is that the psychologists in this field focus so 
exclusively on perceptual response in dynamic situations that they avoid 
making any inferences about mental architecture or cognition.
Fortunately, ecological psychology is neatly compatible with and serves 
as part of the evolutionary rationale for the recent embodiment paradigm 
in cognitive science. Just as Gibson asserted in 1966 that organisms are 
both separate from and importantly continuous with the environment, 
Humberto Maturana maintained in 1980 that 
Living systems are units of interactions; they exist in an environ-
ment. From a purely biological point of view, they cannot be under-
stood independently of the part of the environment with which they 
interact, the niche; nor can the niche be defined independently of 
the living system that occupies it. (qtd. in Gibbs 42)
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And just as ecological psychology claims that our fundamental orienta-
tion toward gravity greatly affects our perceptual-cognitive functioning, 
numerous recent studies in cognition and language indicate that people 
activate bodily based sources of linguistic expressions when they process 
language. Rather than understanding non-literal meanings of expressions 
as matters of convention, “people actually understand ‘toss out a plan,’ for 
instance, in terms of physically tossing something” (Gibbs 184). In like 
manner, “people interpret the meanings of fictive motion statements by 
‘replaying’ the movement, reconstructing a mental enactment of move-
ment implicit in the sentence” (190). Metaphorical expressions, in other 
words, not only have a biological base, but form part of a cycle of action 
and meaning construal between the physical body, the mind-brain, the 
speaker or writer, and the same features of that person’s audience. 
Thus, it seems, while we sit in meetings discussing a proposal for a 
new building or a curriculum revision or whatever else is relevant to our 
particular occupation, the bodies that seem so controlled and passive are 
intimately engaged in our cognitive processing. Likewise, the information 
we pick up—about the proposal, certainly, but also about the attitudes 
of our colleagues, the weather outside the window, the cleanliness of the 
conference room, and so on—has direct relevance to the social-physical 
environment and the feasibility or acceptability of the plan that has been 
“tossed out.” Even if we are strongly predisposed to think, feel, and behave 
in certain ways—and I believe that in this assumption Santa Barbara evo-
lutionary psychology is correct—our thought-and-action always material-
izes in the process of assessing the environment of which each individual 
is also an integral, dynamic dimension.
the cognitive ecology oF the literary environment
Does literature allow us to check out from this cycle, to forget, at least 
for a short time, the body? Such an inference runs contrary to the studies 
on language and cognition Raymond Gibbs cites in Embodiment and 
Cognitive Science, just as it runs contrary to the “interpretive habit to pre-
serve the mimetic” (Phelan 28). If we could switch temporarily to a mode 
of cognition divorced from bodily experience, we would not resort to so 
many representational dimensions in our literature, even literature in a 
postmodern or experimental mode. Although the evolution of conscious-
ness has enabled humans to transcend the episodic memory of primates 
and to participate in long-range planning and hypothetical situations, our 
imaginative constructions are profoundly grounded in our species nature. 
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Part of that nature is a highly developed cognitive ability that enables us 
to detect information, construe it in ways meaningful to our existence and, 
circumstances allowing, act upon it. 
Works of literature unfold in time, and works with a predominantly 
narrative orientation particularly emphasize this temporal dimension. The 
bodily based knowing theorized in ecological psychology and the embodi-
ment paradigm is part of our very process of understanding the language 
of an imaginative text. But I want to insist on the larger claim embedded in 
my thesis: that, as readers, our entire orientation toward a fictive environ-
ment is generally not simply analogous but isomorphic to our orientation 
in the material world. With so much current research in psychology sug-
gesting that we are always thinking in terms of the relative orientation and 
physiological responses of our bodies, it seems unlikely that the body can 
be short-circuited in any meaningful way. 
Literary narratives present readers with dynamic environments that 
typically contain representations of fundamental features of the external 
world, including a physical place rich in inanimate objects and living 
beings. Among the latter, other humans with a distinct set of social rela-
tions are often particularly salient. Yet even though the fictive world must 
have sufficient dimensions of real-world environments for readers to navi-
gate within it, so to speak, it is at the same time a highly artificial environ-
ment whose aspects have been carefully selected, unlike those of actual 
places and spaces. In everyday experience, organisms filter out an abun-
dance of actions and entities that have no relatively meaningful claim upon 
their attention. Stepping into the street, a person will attend to oncoming 
traffic rather than the dead worm being eaten by ants or an inexplicably 
brilliant flower lying in withered leaves by her feet. In the moment before 
she crosses the street, these objects do not strike her as important stimuli 
or opportunities for action if a car is barreling rapidly down the street, 
and she does not attend to them. But a work of fiction is an intentionally 
produced, cognitive artifact, and if a writer describes each of these features 
of the environment as a character crosses the street, readers expect those 
features to have some relevance to the ongoing construction of meaning 
in the text. (The real woman crossing the street is likewise continuously 
producing meaning, but her priorities and the bearing of her environment 
on her well-being are rather different.) In offering itself to our attention as 
a meaningful, humanly constructed cognitive object, a literary work leaves 
us unprepared to filter out extraneous elements.
How does a reader begin to orient in a textual environment? Some of 
this, of course, depends on what the writer offers, but characteristic fea-
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tures of our species psychology are prerequisite to our ability to process 
textual environments, just as they are elementary to way-finding in the 
real world. First among these is the sense of self. So much derided in post-
modern thought, that phylogenetically evolved and ontogenetically devel-
oping sense of “me,” of the core of the organism, serves, as Damasio says, 
as a fundamental point of reference (134–43). The real-world environment 
as I cross the street or buy groceries or teach class is only coherent in rela-
tion to that cognitive-physiological core, which in homo sapiens sapiens is 
a quite sophisticated entity, with a developed autobiographical dimension 
and purposive capacities. It is only this kind of human self, “the autobio-
graphical self,” that is a possible reader of texts, for without it animals 
have no awareness of temporality and cannot refer events in the present 
to the past or anticipate future events.
Writing and reading texts require consciousness, of course, which is 
itself a precondition for autobiographical selfhood and the capacity to 
model the self and others cognitively. Consciousness is, in Damasio’s defi-
nition, “the feeling of knowing,” a prelinguistic awareness of the organ-
ism’s interactions with external phenomena. But how does that interaction 
result in such an intimation? The organism constructs “an account of what 
happens” as a result of its interaction with objects, and “This account is 
a simple narrative without words” (168). Put differently, the narrative 
impulse is so elementary that it not only operates unconsciously but is 
integral to self-identity and consciousness. Consciousness and the self, to 
be plain, are bound up with narrative, and as consciousness and the self 
have developed in their modern forms, stories, spoken and then written 
down, provide a central vehicle for the exploration and play of conscious-
ness.
What this drives home is that the basis of narrative, causal and sequen-
tial thought that typically incorporates some (if not all) of the features 
Jerome Bruner attributes to it—actor, action, goal, scene, and agent—
evolved millions of years before advanced, compositional language. 
Cognitive psychologists widely recognize that narrativity is a basic mode 
of mentation, and sociobiologist Wilson claims that its core feature, causal 
construal, is an epigenetic rule: a robust, built-in, cognitive predisposition 
(See Bruner; Lloyd; Schank; Wilson). The developmental ecological psy-
chologists Eleanor Gibson and Anne Pick, stressing that animacy, agency, 
and causality develop over time for the infant, take the view that “causality 
is a rather sophisticated concept, founded originally on learning about 
control. Control is first discovered in oneself—in controlling hand move-
ments, for example, that have the consequence of moving some object” 
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(194). The infant’s grasp of agency and causality are bound up together, 
and in accordance with this view, causality may not necessarily have an 
innate cognitive dimension. Nevertheless, given the inevitable characteris-
tics of species existence, narrative mentation must necessarily emerge, and 
emerge early, to ensure survival. Hence, whether we judge that narrativity 
is the product of epigenesis (the total results of organic qualities plus 
environment) or the result of life regularly constrained by certain environ-
ment factors, the net conclusion for our purposes is the same: narrative is 
fundamental to survival.
Thus far, I have suggested that autobiographical selfhood, conscious-
ness, and narrative thought, bound up together and indispensable to real-
world navigation of the environment, constitute the cognitive dynamics 
basic to orienting in a literary text. Likewise, the capacity for other forms 
of association serves narrativity but also promotes discernment of other 
types of relations. Missing from this description, though, are other human 
beings or sets of relations. There is very little literature that does not have 
a significant sense of human context, whether that context is dramatized 
within the text or not. In literary works without characters, such as lyric 
poems, there is sometimes a silent addressee. At other times, there is a his-
tory of human relations that serves as the context of the poet’s meditations. 
Sometimes the poet’s address to the reader or an anthropomorphized god 
establishes the minimal human relationship. 
Writing, in short, is a comprehensively social act, no matter how attenu-
ated social interaction becomes in the process. Indeed, language itself likely 
attests to the thorough-going sociality of human beings. Anthropologists 
Leslie Aiello and Robin Dunbar argue that language evolved not for more 
efficient and accurate dissemination of information but to promote social 
cohesion when grooming—the primary mechanism for maintaining affili-
ative bonds—became too time-consuming as the size of humans group 
increased (in Mithen, Neanderthals 135–36). Over the course of about 
six million years, humans evolved from arboreal ancestors protected and 
shaded by trees into a far-ranging, way-finding, knowledge-seeking spe-
cies whose cognitive, emotional, and physiological make-up slowly altered 
as the species sought to meet its needs for food, protection, and mates. 
By about two million years ago, our australopithecine ancestors appear 
relatively well-adapted to open environments; only of moderate size and 
relatively visible, humans were vulnerable to bigger, faster predators and 
would have been unable to protect themselves without the aid of a reason-
ably large, close-knit social group. Precisely for this reason, extraordinary 
The Problem of Orientation in Alice Munro’s “Trespasses”
90
sociality, like exceptional plasticity in behavior and cognition, is an adap-
tive hallmark of our species because it promoted inclusive fitness.
The basic characteristics of the way-finding mind—a self to serve as the 
point of orientation and reference; a propensity to infer causal relations 
and to make other associative connections; an environment rich in poten-
tial affordances; and a close-knit social group that provides the secure basis 
for way-finding activity—still serve to orient us in human life, even though 
the epistemic and geographical range of human life has expanded enor-
mously with the rapid development of culture in the past 10,000 years. 
These cognitive features inform our mode of entry into works of imagina-
tive literature. Because narrative literature usually centers on a problem, 
however, its environments typically highlight the difficulties of one dimen-
sion or another of this epistemic process. This might entail challenges to 
the pick up and interpretation of information about the physical environ-
ment or its cognitive equivalents, such as metaphor and symbol, or to the 
system of social relations within the text. In general, informational deficits 
or imbalances will tax the reader’s effort at cognitive orientation, which in 
turn will inhibit the assimilation and reorganization of that information to 
an ongoing narrative account. 
Like other literary works whose subject is the epistemic process, 
“Trespasses” directs the narrativic impulse that initially operates below 
the level of consciousness toward the conscious problem of narrative con-
struction. In the story’s opening, however, Munro’s delayed revelation of 
the story’s main character in combination with conventional features of 
narrative presents readers with a territory devoid of its true and necessary 
focalizing perspective, that of the ten-year-old Lauren. Meanwhile, Munro 
effectively provides the narrator as an alternative (though ultimately false) 
other “self” with whom readers identify. Thus standing on the perimeter 
of the storyworld rather than entering actively into it, readers are deprived 
of crucial information by orientational disadvantage and immobility. 
Drawing on research from Darwinian psychiatry and studies of obsessive-
compulsive disorder, literary scholar Michael Austin claims that the extra 
energy and discomfort resulting from normal anxiety motivates the gen-
eration of internal narratives and the pursuit of closure. Not only too little 
information but too much creates anxiety, and as Austin points out, in our 
pragmatic mental operations, we value useful rather than necessarily true 
information. Munro not only strains readers’ desire for narrative closure 
by providing information that seems incidental (apparently useless) at 
the outset but forestalls readers’ ability to begin sorting information and 
thus shaping the narrative by refusing to establish an orienting perspective 
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within the storyworld. In rendering problematical the truth that readers 
are cognitively predisposed to pursue—initially, a factual account of past 
events and their connection to the present—Munro redirects attention 
to the self-justifications of her characters and the implications of their 
stories for the submerged main character, Lauren, and her potentially 
focalizing perspective. The story of her life, in fact, is one of a faltering, 
or long-deferred, orientation—in other words, of an unrealized because 
unrecognized self.
territory, orientation, and “tresPasses”
“Trespasses” is one of several Munro stories in which the central char-
acter is an adolescent girl whose parents and their associates live by a 
lingering set of counter-cultural attitudes, which include a mild anti-estab-
lishment posture and a belief that children should be treated as adults. 
While the parents are deluded in their sense of superior honesty and 
freedom from conventional mores (they seem as repressive, viciously pas-
sive aggressive, and jealous as any of the usual human lot), these attitudes 
help them evade the moral and ethical consequences of their actions. 
The gist of the story is this: Eileen and Harry and their daughter Lauren 
have recently moved to a small town where Harry has bought the town’s 
newspaper. While unpacking, Lauren asks about the contents of a box 
that seems particularly light, and her father gives her the first version of 
some past events. Eleven years before, he and Eileen had a baby, soon after 
which Eileen learned that she was pregnant. After a fight, Eileen drove 
off with the infant and had an accident in which the baby was killed. The 
box contains the baby’s ashes. This is just the beginning of Munro’s story, 
however. Another woman, Delphine, who believes she is the biological 
mother of the first (presumably illegally adopted) baby, has tracked them 
down; she also assumes that the living girl Lauren (both babies were 
named Lauren) is her daughter and pursues a relationship with the girl. 
As Lauren gradually begins to suspect, based on Delphine’s hints and indi-
rect revelations, that she might be adopted, Harry and Eileen learn of the 
friendship that has emerged between the two. The result is the late-night 
attempt to provide the canonical narrative of the past events and the hasty, 
long-delayed ceremony to scatter the ashes of the baby who died a decade 
before.
The thirty-seven-page story is told in seventeen sections that vary in 
length from under a page to about six pages. It starts with a section cov-
ering the first part of the final scene, the four characters finding a site on 
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a riverbank to scatter the ashes, and ends with the rest of the scene, the 
scattering of ashes and the beginning of the ride back into town. On one 
level, then, the present event of dispersing the ashes functions convention-
ally as a narrative frame. However, Munro develops this overt structural 
circularity on more subtle chronological and psychological levels, since 
the town is a place of childhood vacations for Harry, and since each adult 
character, through unacknowledged feelings of guilt, responsibility, and 
desire deviates from but ultimately returns to his or her version of the 
past events. The story thus enacts a debased version of the myth of eternal 
return, wherein the structural return to the oozy riverbank reflects the 
return of each of the adult characters to his or her muddy version of the 
baby’s adoption and death.
In the first six pages of the story, as I will attempt to show in what fol-
lows, the pervasive self-deceptions of Eileen and Harry govern the distri-
bution of information in the narrative. Munro orchestrates this process 
of deception at the level of narrative technique, employing an ostensibly 
reliable narrator who, beguiling readers with her intelligence and charm, 
surveys the narrative world and delivers a comic, apparently loosely con-
nected, and superficial account of events. In this manner, Munro compels 
readers to stand quite outside the narrative world for the first five pages, 
in alliance with the narrator and without any hint that there will be an 
orienting perspective among the characters. To put this in terms of my 
ecological model, Munro essentially inhibits the process of information 
pick up by neglecting to identify Lauren as the protagonist and by simulta-
neously suppressing the girl’s orienting (or focalizing) perspective, which 
in consequence only belatedly initiates the imaginative correlative of the 
autobiographical self (in other words, the readerly identification with 
the character). For many pages, then, Munro effectively keeps readers 
out of her true story, even while masking the central informational and 
perspectival deficits she has strategically employed. Virtually stalled at 
the perimeter because deprived of the orienting consciousness required 
for full entrance into and movement within the domain of the storyworld 
(or textual environment), the readers, like Lauren, lack the fundamental 
point of orientation (the self) to initiate the epistemic process of narrative 
construction. 
Another way of putting this is that Munro’s story, like Wordsworth’s 
“Simon Lee,” does not begin at the beginning of the true story, but like that 
poem, begins with a sense of narrative conventionality that carries with 
it a deceptive assurance of proper shape, which presumes the control of 
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emotion and anxiety that comes with closure and the containment of facts. 
Munro’s first short section certainly promises this:
They drove out of town around midnight—Harry and Delphine in 
the front seat and Eileen and Lauren in the back. The sky was clear 
and the snow had slid off the trees but had not melted underneath 
them or on the rocks that jutted out beside the road. Harry stopped 
the car by the bridge.
“This’ll do.”
“Somebody might see us stopped here,” Eileen said. “They might 
stop to check out what we’re up to.”
He started to drive again. They turned onto the first little country 
road, where they all got out of the car and walked carefully down 
the bank, just a short way, among lacy black cedars. There was a 
slight crackle to the snow, though the ground underneath was soft 
and mucky. Lauren was still wearing her pajamas under her coat, 
but Eileen had made her put on her boots.
“Okay here?” Eileen said.
Harry said, “It’s not very far off the road.”
“It’s far enough.” 
Noting that narratologists and writers have long stressed that there 
are always related events prior to the start of a formal narrative, Brian 
Richardson concludes that “there is no ready formula for ascertaining the 
actual beginning of the story,” and that judgments about where a narrative 
begins proceeds on a case-by-case basis (117). In this case, Munro offers 
up a balance between certainty and uncertainty that persuades readers 
that they will soon be on the way to constructing a reasonable sequential 
narrative that explains the mysterious activity of the characters in the 
initial scene. First, the narrator provides not only the names of the four 
characters but describes where they are sitting in relation to one another 
in the car. The fact that Lauren is wearing pajamas and that “Eileen had 
made her put on her boots” establishes that Lauren is a child and that 
Eileen is most likely her mother or guardian. Likewise, the exchange about 
an appropriate place to stop suggests that Harry and Eileen are partners. 
Although Delphine’s relationship with the others is as yet undisclosed, 
this omission is not initially troublesome, because Munro has introduced 
her characters and sketched relationships to which readers will attribute 
central significance. Second, the narrator establishes a number of material 
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facts, including the season, the approximate time of day, and the type of 
physical environment, a mucky riverbank somewhere in the countryside. 
In sum, as readers survey this cognitive environment, they have the sort 
of basic yet incomplete information about physical place, social relations, 
and group effort that stimulates further exploratory activity and meaning 
construction. In Austin’s terms, we experience (albeit indirectly) the 
normal anxiety that motivates the generation of narrative and the pursuit 
of closure. Because information is limited at this point in the readers’ 
experience, they are not hampered by the need to categorize it as useful, 
true, or multivalent (for instance, information that is simultaneously lit-
eral and metaphorical, like the “soft and mucky” ground underneath the 
snow), even if veteran readers of Munro will be suspicious of such surface 
simplicity and directness. It is the readers’ assumption, in short, that the 
information provided so far is both useful and true. 
Research on embodied cognition somewhat modifies earlier theories 
of script-based understanding, indicating that while readers “use spa-
tial perspectives to construct mental models of narrative texts,” these 
models or simulations are flexible and dynamic. Some research suggests 
that the construction of such a model depends on adopting the perspec-
tive of a protagonist, a finding that probably has a pronounced bearing 
on works that foreground narrative intentions (Gibbs 201, 202–03). In 
section one, Munro provides readers with enough information to begin 
a cognitive simulation, and the level of narrative competence indicates—
again deceptively—that readers can expect to elaborate on and build this 
simulation until it explains the mysterious opening scene. At this point 
in “Trespasses,” most readers probably expect two things in the subse-
quent pages: 1) more narrative information at least glancingly related to 
the opening scene on the riverbank, and 2) some developing sense of the 
relationships between the characters, which sense entails, typically, devel-
opments in the relations between the reader and the characters. Instead, 
Munro strategically delays in both respects. Although it is certainly 
unlikely that all cognitive narrative simulations require the perspective 
of a protagonist, most probably do, because fiction is governed largely by 
human considerations (ethical, behavioral, psychological, and so forth), 
and because the protagonist provides the means of narrative construal 
and thus knowledge. Of course, not all literature invites or encourages 
readerly involvement; this is particularly the case with satire and comedy, 
because it is distinctly unnatural to identify with the subject of ridicule. By 
contrast, opening on a note of mystery, as Munro does, primes the readers’ 
desire for information and evaluative mechanisms, foremost among them 
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an appropriate orienting perspective that will make information pick up 
and thus meaning and narrative construal possible.
Munro’s readers hardly meander aimlessly in the beginning of the story 
(indeed, could not do so if they chose to), more than willing to collude 
with the witty and cheerful narrator. In the long run, Munro thus effects 
the double action of the text as the readers, unwittingly hampered by the 
initial deprivation of the necessary orienting perspective, belatedly come 
into a sobering consciousness of the grim story underneath the narrator’s 
delightful chatter, one that mirrors Lauren’s slowly emerging knowledge 
of her own submerged history. For the time being, however, readers are 
(mis)guided by the chatty and seemingly incidental nature of the narrator’s 
discourse. For instance, in the second and third sections and in the begin-
ning of the fourth, the narrator gives the readers a tour of the surface geog-
raphy of the story, including the town and the house to which the family 
has relocated, and in this manner the readers circle, inevitably trespassing, 
without the capacity to sort clues along a proper route.
Section two focuses on the old hotel on the main street of the town, 
which Harry says he remembers from his summers in the area, and where 
he takes his family for dinner soon after they relocate. Much of this second 
section is taken up with an exchange between the principal characters 
and another family celebrating the anniversary of an elderly couple. The 
exchange between the two parties does a good deal to characterize Eileen, 
Harry, and (latently) Lauren, but the seemingly incidental quality of the 
scene downplays the quality of the information Munro offers. When Harry 
asks the couple for “the recipe for a happy marriage,” for instance, the 
old man says, “All-eeze keep a foot on er neck,” and all the adults laugh. 
While Harry is angling for a way to turn this into an anecdote for the 
newspaper, Eileen, once out of earshot, asks, “How do they manage to get 
that fat? I don’t understand it. You’d have to eat day and night to get that 
fat” (199). As the old man’s joke about control and conflict is deflected 
by the superficial preoccupations of Eileen and Harry—a choice anecdote 
for the newspaper, the middle-class sophisticate’s shock at obesity and the 
canned green beans served in the summer months—Munro introduces 
the theme of the suppressed secrets, animosities, and violence in sexual 
unions. However, given the seemingly incidental nature of the scene and 
the lack of a focalizing perspective, laughing off the old man’s comment 
seems forgivable, and it is only in retrospect that readers realize how 
much useful information has been offered in a characteristically off-hand 
manner. Both as a matter of tone and delayed focalization, then, readers 
stand mainly outside the storyworld, identifying with the narrator for the 
The Problem of Orientation in Alice Munro’s “Trespasses”
96
time being, since her perspective is the only one that has been offered 
thus far. Furthermore, any clues to serious themes and character traits are 
deflected by Munro’s modulations into a comic tone, such as her adoption 
of free indirect style: “This was the year after Harry had quit his job on 
a news-magazine because he was burned out” (198). This comic touch, 
which encourages readers to take matters lightly, appears in the first para-
graph of the section—a paragraph that is, in fact, nearly all about Harry, 
and thus one that keeps readers at the story’s perimeter.
Importantly, readers need not only Lauren’s perspective but also informa-
tion about the child to construct, ultimately, the significant story in these 
thirty-seven pages. But in the second and third sections, the absence of her 
necessary focalizing perspective is complemented by a sense of her virtual 
absence from the scenes, for the narrator provides little information about 
her, so that, in fact, readers nearly forget that she’s in them at all—which 
is, of course, sadly the point. In section two, aside from the sentence 
that places her in this scene—“He and Eileen and Lauren went there for 
dinner on their first Sunday night in town”—the narrator does not men-
tion Lauren, nor does the girl participate in the conversation (198). For all 
intents and purposes, she becomes narratively invisible. Like the thematic 
continuity between the old man’s remark and the repressed or dark secret 
at the story’s center, Lauren’s invisibility attests to the narrator’s neglect 
of the protagonist, which repeats at the level of narrative technique, as I 
have said, the self-deceptions (and, indeed, general self-absorption) char-
acteristic of Eileen and Harry. Because readers have such limited informa-
tion, and because the narrator’s wit primarily draws the reader on, Munro 
effects a subtle complicity in Lauren’s neglect.
Likewise, readers remain stalled at the story’s perimeter in the third 
section, which provides a succinct narrative summary of the transforma-
tion of the hotel dining room into a coffee shop by the new owner, Mr. 
Palagian, who hires an as-yet-unidentified woman (in fact, Delphine) to 
work for him. The last third of this section veers into a comic portrait of 
Harry as Munro indulges again in free indirect style: 
He was hoping that one day Mr. Palagian would thaw out and tell 
the story of his life. Harry kept a file full of ideas for books and was 
always on the lookout for life stories. Someone like Mr. Palagian—or 
even that fat tough-talking waitress, he said—could be harboring a 
contemporary tragedy or adventure which would make a best seller.
The thing about life, Harry had told Lauren, was to live in the 
world with interest. To keep your eyes open and see the possibili-
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ties—see the humanity—in everybody you met. To be aware. If he 
had anything at all to teach her it was that. Be aware. (201) 
Though entertained by the echo of Harry’s pretentious blathering in these 
paragraphs, readers are nonetheless sensitively directed to note the long-
suffering addressee (“he said”; “Harry had told Lauren”), and also, to mark 
the repeated, emphatic, and final command (“Be aware”), quite as though 
the author is speaking over her characters and narrator and directly to her 
readers.
Four pages into the story, then, readers are apt to experience a sense 
of present and perhaps ultimate shapelessness—inconsequential and for-
gotten characters (such as Delphine), unnecessary information, dangling 
mystery—and no clear starting point from which to begin assembling a 
unified narrative. Perhaps for readers, a low-level epistemic frustration 
replaces full-blown anxiety, because, after all, we are not at risk for direct 
consequences, and because we are so far innocent regarding the truly 
sordid subject of the story. But sure enough, this is the transitional sec-
tion. First, following on the final paragraph of section three (above), sec-
tion four brings the focus gradually onto Lauren (who is, just subsequent 
to this, fully established as the protagonist and the orienting perspective 
in section five). Second, as the narrator directs the readers’ attention to 
Lauren in the second paragraph of section four, a shift in both tone and 
subject matter prepares readers for the perspective they have so far been 
denied. Signaling Lauren’s presence as implied auditor at the close of 
section three and commanding attention—“Be aware” (or warning the 
readers?: beware)—the narrator next gives the girl pride of place, the first 
sentence in section four, but then, like a busy magpie, having unearthed 
Lauren, immediately tosses her aside for a brighter treasure: “Lauren made 
her own breakfast, usually cereal with maple syrup instead of milk. Eileen 
took her coffee back to bed and drank it slowly. She didn’t want to talk. She 
had to get herself in gear to face the day, working in the newspaper office” 
(201). But readers (who surely think Lauren is older than her ten years 
until nearly halfway through the story) have registered the twin signs of 
neglect, Lauren’s repulsive repast and Eileen’s sluggish maternal trans-
mission. Importantly, although the narrative is not yet focalized within 
Lauren’s perspective, readers, no longer tracing the town’s perimeter, are 
peering into the inner territory of the story, the family home; in keeping 
with this, the nature and quantity of information available is accordingly 
constrained. Thus, while this paragraph, like the final paragraphs of sec-
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tion three about Harry, is still humorous, it is less so than the story in sec-
tion two, because it attests to Eileen’s utter self-absorption. 
The second paragraph of section four moves subtly away from the focus 
on Harry and Eileen and toward Lauren as it describes the location of the 
house (the edge of town) and, in some detail, Lauren’s solitary autumn 
afternoons, carrying refuse to Harry’s nascent compost heap. In this 
manner, the new sense of focus on the isolated child and, with it, the shift 
to a setting (creepily foreshadowing the final scene on the riverbank) pre-
pare readers for the next paragraph, which initiates Lauren’s perspective:
Her life was a lot different now from the way it had been just a few 
weeks ago, when she and Harry and Eileen were driving to one of 
the lakes to swim in the hot afternoons. Then later in the evenings, 
she and Harry had gone on adventure walks around the town, while 
Eileen sanded and painted and wall-papered the house, claiming 
she could do that faster and better on her own. All that she had 
wanted Harry to do then was to get all his boxes of papers and his 
filing cabinet and desk into a ratty little room in the basement, out 
of her way. Lauren had helped him. (202)
With this paragraph, Munro modulates the narrative voice, so that the 
teller, having guided readers into the house and physical territory of this 
story, identifies her protagonist and focuses within Lauren’s perspective, 
simultaneously relinquishing her tour-guide function in the service of a 
higher goal. Exactly how much readers gather of the surprising fund of 
information available through this subtly sudden act of orientation cannot 
be precisely claimed, but it is surely at this point that a perspective, a 
fictionally perceiving self, is finally available from which to survey the 
quality and kinds of information provided and actively to begin construing 
a narrative of value. 
Following on the previous paragraph’s portrait of the solitary Lauren 
traipsing toward the compost heap in the autumnal afternoon, the first 
independent clause of this paragraph strikes a note of conscious aware-
ness and melancholy, prepared by the previous paragraph but nevertheless 
at odds with the sense of the characters (remember: mainly Harry and 
Eileen) thus far. In so doing, it establishes a theme of role reversal between 
Lauren and her parents that readers finally clearly register, as they navi-
gate, along with Lauren, between her mother and her father and the pri-
marily human information that governs her life: Harry’s childishness (“she 
and Harry had gone on adventure walks around the town”); the thinly 
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veiled tensions between the parents (Eileen’s vicious renovations while 
Harry and Lauren adventure; Harry’s place in the basement). “Her life was 
a lot different now from the way it was just a few weeks ago”: the clause 
seems deeper than it is, precisely because the story’s narrative technique 
no longer mimics Harry and Eileen’s self-deception, focusing readers on a 
vulnerable character who, so unlike her parents, is sensible to loneliness, 
transition, and loss.
In theorizing how our human ecological cognition operates within 
narrative, I have said four salient features of our evolved psychology 
have high importance: a fictional “self” that serves to orient; a capacity 
for association, but especially causal (and hence narrative) construal; 
an environment rich in information (potential affordances); and a social 
group. In “Trespasses,” once Munro initiates Lauren’s focal perspective, 
the problem of informational evaluation that besets readers in the first 
three sections is solved, because orientation and territory are mutually 
related phenomena. This goes back to and, I believe, reinforces Phelan’s 
point about our readerly commitment to character functions. Put simply, 
we can learn from characters in a way that we cannot learn from narra-
tors, because characters are (for the most part) limited in ways that we are 
as living humans. Narrative omniscience may well be a fiction, but many 
narrators, like Munro’s here, are physically and otherwise unconstrained, 
so they are fairly useless as epistemic guides for readers.
In the relationship of Lauren’s just-focalized perspective to just-defined 
territory, the disposition of information in the environment is, in the sub-
sequent scene, sudden and relentless in its informational relevance. Down 
in the basement, Lauren lifts the peculiar box.
“Now,” he said. “Now, Lauren. I could make up some kind of lie 
to tell you, but I am going to tell you the truth. Because I believe 
that children should be told the truth. At least by the time they’re 
your age, they should be. But in this case it has to be secret. Okay?”
Lauren said, “Okay.” Something made her wish, already, that he 
wouldn’t do this. (203)
Once readers have been offered the self via whom they will construe the 
narrative, they follow closely but also depart from the character in judg-
ments and narrative shaping. In Munro’s text, the process begins at this 
juncture, when Lauren’s innocent question brings down upon her the 
gruesome story of the first baby’s death. Lauren cannot use this informa-
tion; in ecological terms, it is not, for her, an affordance, an opportunity 
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for action. By contrast, it is extraordinarily useful to readers, who feel no 
compunction about, for instance, judging Harry for his parental irrespon-
sibility and deviousness, and for building that judgment into the story. 
Were I to conduct a complete analysis of readers’ narrative construal 
of the story, I would elucidate further this relationship to Lauren, who 
cannot herself take information, like readers, and shape it into a story. She 
is simply stuck with it, and with the increased load of anxiety that comes 
from too much slightly conflicting information of a kind particularly inas-
similable for a child. Munro brilliantly builds on informational ambiguity 
and anxiety through the progress of the Lauren-Delphine relationship in 
sections eight through eleven, which confuse not just facts but familial-
social relationships, thus developing the complexity of the information 
that Lauren and the readers must process.
Toward the end of the story, protagonist and readers share an exhaus-
tion with the closely related versions of events and with the insistence that 
each version be told. In the last hashing-out of the story of the dead baby, 
Eileen reveals that she and Harry had been arguing about an abortion just 
before the accident. Against Harry’s objections, Eileen insists that Lauren 
can now handle this truth:
“Yes, but it’s true,” Eileen said. “Lauren can take it, she knows it 
wasn’t like it was her.”
Lauren spoke up, surprising herself.
“It was me,” she said. “Who was it if it wasn’t me?” (232)
To the best of the readers’ knowledge, Lauren’s statement is factually cor-
rect, since Harry has provided documentation to prove to Delphine that 
Lauren is his and Eileen’s biological child. While Munro may manipulate, 
for a time, our hyper-narrativizing tendency in the story, and while the 
fact that Eileen was pregnant with Lauren does matter to the girl, on some 
level, no facts seem to matter at all any more, at least not to this reader. 
For what seems overwhelmingly clear is that all accounts provided by 
the adults are continuous and relentless acts of self-assertion that isolate 
Lauren from her peers and now confuse her sense of family and origin.
“You are a kid that is not short of information,” Delphine tells Lauren, 
just as she’s about to give her more that Lauren would do well without 
(220). As my overview of ecological cognition has suggested, for all 
human beings, the social efficacy of our environment is a precondition to 
our ability to orient and wayfind within the physical terrain. This is espe-
cially so for children, whose social lives and beings are governed by their 
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families, which typically manage the flow of information to the children. 
In “Trespasses,” Harry and Eileen perform no such function, instead over-
loading their child with burdensome information, a child, furthermore, 
whose selfhood they have not even bothered to acknowledge. For readers, 
the ethical and the aesthetic meet up as soon as they realize Munro’s initial 
technique of disorientation mimics the ecological fragility of self, perspec-
tive, and life story for Lauren. I hope that the ecological ground of my 
discussion has deepened my readers’ sense of the relationship between 
Munro’s technique and the human meaning of her story.1
University of New Orleans
note
1 I am grateful to Anne Boyd, Catherine Loomis, Doreen Piano, and Elizabeth Steeby, the 
members of our working writers group at the University of New Orleans, for their helpful 
comments on a draft of this essay. 
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